On 2 August 1964, North Vietnamese watch torpedo pontoons assaulted the USS Maddox (DD-731) while the destroyer was in worldwide waters in the Gulf of Tonkin. There is no questioning that reality. Be that as it may, what occurred in the Gulf during the late long stretches of 4 August—and the considerable activities taken by U.S. authorities in Washington—has been apparently shrouded in disarray and puzzle since the time that night.
About 200 reports the National Security Agency (NSA) declassified and delivered in 2005 and 2006, in any case, have helped revealed insight into what happened in the Gulf of Tonkin on 4 August. The papers, more than 140 of them characterized top mystery, incorporate telephone records, oral-history interviews, signals insight (SIGINT) messages, and sequences of the Tonkin occasions created by the Department of Defense and NSA authorities.
Joined with as of late declassified tapes of calls from White House authorities associated with the occasions and recently revealed realities about Tonkin, these reports give convincing proof about the ensuing choices that prompted the full responsibility of U.S. military to the Vietnam War.
In mid 1964, South Vietnam started leading a secretive arrangement of U.S.- sponsored commando assaults and insight gathering missions along the North Vietnamese coast. Codenamed Operations Plan (OPLAN) 34A, the exercises were considered and regulated by the Department of Defense, with the help of the Central Intelligence Agency, and did by the South Vietnamese Navy. Introductory triumphs, nonetheless, were restricted; various South Vietnamese looters were caught, and OPLAN 34A units endured hefty setbacks.
In July 1964, Lieutenant General William C. Westmoreland, leader of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, moved the activity's strategies from commando assaults ashore to shore bombardments utilizing mortars, rockets, and recoilless rifles shot from South Vietnamese watch boats.
The U.S. Naval force, then, had been leading intermittent surveillance and SIGINT-gathering missions farther seaward in the Tonkin Gulf. Destroyers completed these supposed Desoto watches. After missions in December 1962 and April of the following year, watches were booked for 1964 in the region of OPLAN 34A strikes.
The United States was playing a perilous game. The South Vietnamese—directed OPLAN 34A attacks and the U.S. Naval force's Desoto watches could be seen as synergistic endeavors against North Vietnamese targets. In actuality, there was no coordination between the powers leading the tasks.
